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Abstract: This paper aims to clarify the 
relationship between consciousness and 
attention through theoretical considerations 
about evolution. Specifically, we will argue that 
the empirical findings on attention and the basic 
considerations concerning the evolution of the 
different forms of attention demonstrate that 
consciousness and attention must be dissociated 
regardless of which definition of these terms 
one uses. To the best of our knowledge, no 
extant view on the relationship between 
consciousness and attention has this advantage. 
Because of this characteristic, this paper 
presents a principled and neutral way to settle 
debates concerning the relationship between 
consciousness and attention, without falling into 
disputes about the meaning of these terms. A 
decisive conclusion of this approach is that 
extreme views on the relationship between 
consciousness and attention must be rejected, 
including identity and full dissociation views. 
There is an overlap between the two within 
conscious attention, but developing a full 
understanding of this mechanism requires 
further empirical investigations. 
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On the evolution of conscious attention 
 
Herbert Spencer famously wrote that “If the 
doctrine of Evolution is true, the inevitable 
implication is that Mind can be understood only 
by observing how Mind is evolved” (Spencer, 
1855, p. 291). Given the general importance of 
the theory of evolution in scientific explanations 
of biology, this statement seems 
unchallengeable. The last few decades of 
research in psychology and neuroscience, 
however, show that it is an ambiguous assertion. 
The conscious mind has proved to be elusive 
when it comes to evolutionary explanations, to 
the extent that many theorists argue that 
phenomenal consciousness1 cannot be adaptive 
because it has no specific function (e.g., 
Chalmers, 1996). Although the consensus is that 
Spencer’s claim must hold for most cognitive 
processes, phenomenal conscious experience 
seems to escape functional explanations and has 
consequences that have not been properly 
understood. This paper focuses on one of these 
                                                
1 Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective experience 
of “what it is like” to be in a certain mental state, as Nagel 
(1974) famously described.  
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consequences: the tenuous account of the 
apparent relationship between consciousness 
and attention. 
While most cognitive psychologists agree 
that attention—the selective filtering of 
perceptual information—must have been an 
early adaptation in the evolution of cognitive 
systems (Ward, 2013), none would consider 
consciousness to be an early adaptation, but 
rather a later adaptation in cognitive 
development. In this sense, which has yet to be 
fully clarified, consciousness may help serve the 
purpose of controlling integrative aspects of 
selective attention (e.g., see Rensink, 2014). 
Nevertheless, a longstanding claim in the 
literature is that evolutionary considerations are 
useless for an understanding of consciousness 
because conscious awareness seems to lack any 
specific function, since integrative processes can 
occur without conscious awareness (e.g., 
Mudrik, Faivre, & Koch, in press; Talsma, 
Senkowski, Soto-Faraco, & Woldorff, 2010; 
Zmigrod & Hommel, 2011). Some even claim 
that consciousness might be a spandrel, that is, a 
by-product resulting from increasing complexity 
in brain structures that does not serve an 
evolutionarily adaptive purpose (e.g., see 
Carruthers, 2000; Dennett, 2005; Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979; Polger & Flanagan, 2002; 
Rosenthal, 2008). This creates a fundamental 
problem in our current understanding of 
consciousness because it seems to prevent a 
functional analysis of conscious attention, that 
is, the “reportable” type of attention that is part 
of conscious awareness (i.e., where the contents 
of attention are consciously accessible such that 
one could report detecting this information). 
This specific problem has not received a 
sustained treatment in the literature and has 
decisive consequences concerning the 
relationship between consciousness and 
attention. 
Since most theorists argue for the non-
adaptability of phenomenal consciousness, an 
important theoretical implication is the inherent 
dissociation between consciousness and 
attention. That is, the relationship between 
attention and consciousness cannot be one that 
co-evolved in a way that links the two 
functionally under this perspective. 
Surprisingly, little focus has been given to the 
evolution of attention (but see Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2013; Tooby & Cosmides, 1995; Ward, 
2013; Wright & Ward, 2008, pp. 235-241), 
especially in terms of how it relates to the 
evolution of consciousness, which has received 
more treatment in the literature (e.g., Edelman, 
Baars, & Seth, 2005; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; 
Nichols & Grantham, 2000; Polger & Flanagan, 
2002; Seth & Baars, 2005).  
Evolution, therefore, becomes a central 
consideration against theories that identify 
consciousness with attention. For example, 
Prinz (2012) argues that consciousness should 
be identified with attention, since otherwise one 
might have to provide an account of 
consciousness that would be theoretically 
difficult to defend (e.g., by calling on dualism); 
thus, he rejects proposals for different kinds of 
consciousness and argues that there is only 
phenomenal consciousness. By “attention”, 
however, Prinz means something like “attention 
to information that is available for working 
memory”, which denies that some forms of 
consciousness even should be called 
“consciousness” under this proposal. This 
means that consciousness just is, for Prinz, 
information that is available for working 
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memory, plus a subjective phenomenal 
experience (Prinz, 2012, pp. 5-6). By contrast, 
Tallon-Baudry (2012) argues that the findings 
allegedly confirming such identity views are 
based on confused and biased approaches to 
data analysis. More importantly, she found 
neurological evidence suggesting a significant 
dissociation between the neural correlates of 
attention-access to information and conscious 
experience. 
Although the amount of experimental 
evidence against the identity view keeps 
growing (e.g., Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; 
Lamme, 2006; Tallon-Baudry, 2012; van 
Boxtel, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2010), an 
evolutionary approach provides a principled 
theoretic way to explain why scientists are 
finding such dissociations. Thus, instead of 
arguing for dissociation based on inductive 
arguments from specific bodies of evidence, we 
argue for a more decisive and principled reason 
for dissociation based on the importance of 
evolution in scientific explanations. The unique 
advantage of this theoretical approach is that it 
is interpretation-independent—regardless of 
how the varieties of “consciousness” or 
“attention” are defined within the theories 
currently available, there will be a substantial 
dissociation between them. This eliminates 
problems concerning the multiple definitions of 
these terms and puts the current evidence under 
a clearer theoretical light. 
This new approach to the debate concerning 
the relationship between consciousness and 
attention is decisive in at least two respects. If it 
is true that consciousness has no cognitive 
function, then the type of dissociation between 
consciousness and attention must be either the 
most severe (full dissociation) or very severe, 
with very few cases of conscious attention. 
Alternatively, if consciousness has a specific 
evolutionary function and theorists seek to 
provide an identity view or even a mild 
dissociation view, then they will face the 
challenge of specifying how consciousness, as a 
cognitive function, coevolved with attention, 
which can be defined in terms of specific types 
of attentive functions (e.g., voluntary, object-
based, feature-based, spatial). We suspect that 
this latter possibility will not materialize given 
our current theoretical understanding. Another 
complication for identifying consciousness with 
attention is that different forms of attention must 
have evolved at different times, further 
dissociating them from conscious attention. 
 
 
1. Attention as an early adaptation 
 
In their influential paper on the evolution of 
cognitive functions, Tooby and Cosmides 
(1995, p. 1195) argue that attention must be one 
of the earliest adaptations in the evolution of the 
human mind. Although they talk about 
perception more generally in the same passage, 
it is clear that they refer to basic low-level 
attentional processes, such as those involved in 
navigation and feature detection. Indeed, one 
can hardly think of a more basic cognitive 
function than selective attention for motor 
control and navigation. For example, many 
animals navigate by exploiting features of the 
environment, such as locating the position and 
angle of the sun to determine orientation, or 
performing computations on how locations of 
external features relate to their egocentric frame 
of reference. Beyond this, there has been 
minimal examination of the evolution of 
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attention, with only brief discussions found in 
the current literature (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 
2013; Ward, 2013; Wright & Ward, 2008, pp. 
235-241). 
Spatial and feature-based attention are 
fundamental for performing tasks critical for 
survival. Parsing the environment into objects 
and spatial coordinates, or predator/prey and 
conspecific, requires these forms of attention. 
These basic forms of attention can interact with 
other cognitive capacities, such as short-term 
and long-term memory, in order to produce 
richer representations. Animals with robust 
nervous systems can use episodic and semantic 
memory to recognize targets in their 
environment and increase the repertoire of 
objects and features that can be attended at any 
specific time. These capacities, in turn, become 
the basis for optimal decision-making, action 
planning, and task-switching. These are 
behaviors that animals display in their 
environment and which require a fair amount of 
cognitive integration. It is likely that skills 
related to attention were critical for survival as 
competition for resources increased during the 
Cambrian era. Incidentally, some researchers, 
particularly in the biological sciences, argue that 
the increase in information complexity that 
accompanied integrative processes of attention 
and memory is an indicator of the emergence of 
consciousness (e.g., Nichols & Grantham, 
2000). The problem with this proposal is that 
most functions of feature integration and the 
higher complexity purportedly related to 
conscious experience can be fully understood 
and explained by attention without phenomenal 
awareness (e.g., Mudrik, et al., in press). 
The evolutionary drives of competition and 
the struggle for survival require that species 
develop some form of interfacing agent-based 
“attention”, with attentional mechanisms that 
were selected because of their automaticity as 
immediate responses to the environment. 
Reflexive reactions to features of the 
environment that immediately trigger or grab 
attention must be, therefore, interfaced with 
processes of associative learning that initiate 
with sustained voluntary attention and 
eventually became automatic or effortless. 
Success in search tasks and behavioral routines, 
such as those associated with hunting, becomes 
a staple of the fitness of a species. The degree of 
cognitive integration required for this 
interaction between the different forms of 
attention is significant and marks an important 
transition in the way in which information is 
stored—a transition in informational 
complexity, as defined by Smith and Szathmáry 
(1995). Furthermore, the integration required for 
search behavior also demands short-term and 
long-term memory, as well as mappings 
between frames of reference that constitute the 
egocentric perspective present in creatures with 
a central nervous system (see Merker, 2005). 
Thus, many forms of attention must be 
adaptive and must have evolved very early, as 
organisms diversified and developed central 
nervous systems in order to cope with ever more 
complex and demanding interactions with their 
ecosystems. From basic discrimination to highly 
integrated search behavior, there is a repertoire 
of attentive skills that must be in place in order 
for a species to adapt and survive. Crucially, 
these skills do not constitute a ladder from lower 
forms of cognitive systems to higher forms, and 
higher forms of cognitive complexity are not 
causally necessitated by lower forms. Rather, 
the transition to complex forms of attention is 
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best captured in terms of intentionality (i.e., the 
“aboutness” of cognitive states that makes them 
directed toward a specific thing) and of feature 
binding into higher-level object representations. 
Creatures with the capacity to integrate 
representations with content (about the 
environment, its objects, and spatiotemporal 
structure) are capable of many other abilities 
that depend on attention and representation, 
such as learning and remembering information. 
Similarly, communication and language 
capacities are related to this form of high-level 
symbolic representation.  
One can illustrate the previous point by 
examining the evolution of sensory modalities. 
Animals with a nervous system capable of 
registering light waves and encoding that 
information in a representational fashion, which 
entails intentionality, can cope with many tasks 
that depend on attending to features of the 
environment. In this sense, intentionality must 
be present at some level for goal-directed 
behavior. For example, one can imagine a 
creature that is capable of selective attention for 
object and feature recognition within a sensory 
modality equivalent to human vision. Such a 
visual sensorial apparatus would not be inferior 
to the more complex cross-modal sensorial 
registration that characterizes mammals, for 
instance. This cross-modal integration allows 
animals to significantly enhance the degree of 
confirmation of information across different 
encoding systems (e.g., light or sound waves), 
and interactions between different modalities 
can facilitate perception, for example, by 
enhancing motion perception through the 
localization of sounds associated with an object 
(Zmigrod, Spapé, & Hommel, 2009).  
Perceptual questions that the brain needs to 
answer within a single modality (e.g., is this the 
same object that was moving a second ago?) can 
be formulated within a broader network of 
possibilities, such as the simultaneous 
instantiation of properties detected cross-
modally from a single distal stimulus. Not only 
spatial attention, but temporally-sustained 
attention becomes more flexible and dynamic. It 
is well known that each modality has a unique 
simultaneity window and that these windows 
differ considerably (see Pöppel, 1988). These 
different windows play a compensatory role for 
the speeds of the energies that they are designed 
to register, and are part of a cross-modal 
window of simultaneity required for motor 
control tasks (Montemayor, 2013). The 
evolution of different modalities, therefore, 
allowed for a flexible, dynamic, highly 
integrative, and evidence-driven centralized 
system for information processing. 
Such arguments indicate that one cannot 
reasonably deny that attention, in its many 
forms, is an adaptation. The key point, however, 
is that these forms of attention are defined 
functionally, and there are strong arguments 
against functional accounts of phenomenal 
consciousness. While the cognitive functions 
associated with attention are fundamental 
adaptations in the course of the evolution of the 
central nervous system, none of these functions 
seem to require conscious awareness, which is a 
point on which many researchers agree (e.g., 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2006; van 
Boxtel, et al., 2010).  
Therefore, although selective attention is 
certainly an early adaptation in the evolution of 
the human brain, the claim that conscious 
attention is an adaptation is considerably more 
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controversial. The functional-computational 
approach that is assumed in evolutionary theory 
and cognitive psychology has been criticized as 
useless to account for consciousness by many 
theorists (e.g., Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1996). 
Even if one defines consciousness 
functionally—as in global workspace accounts 
(Baars, 1988, 1998; Dehaene & Naccache, 
2001), or an integrative account (Tononi, 2008, 
2012), or even in an account that emphasizes 
learning (Meuwese, Post, Scholte, & Lamme, 
2013)—one can still argue that attention is an 
early adaptation and that the alleged functions 
of consciousness must be a much later addition 
to the repertoire of cognitive capacities, thus 
demonstrating their dissociation based on this 
early versus late adaptation argument. 
Furthermore, there seems to be consensus 
concerning the claim that consciousness 
appeared recently in the evolution of cognitive 
capacities. While there are several accounts on 
the evolution of consciousness (ranging from 
complete skepticism to proposals that 
consciousness may be a spandrel), none of these 
accounts claim that consciousness is an 
adaptation. Cognitive scientists are, therefore, 
confronted with the puzzling challenge of 
reconciling conflicting claims concerning 
consciousness and attention into a theoretically 
unified account of the evolution of conscious 
attention.  
In what follows, we explore the theoretical 
options that are available and present a theory 
for the evolution of conscious attention that 
entails a severe dissociation between 
consciousness and attention. While most forms 
of attention must have evolved early as 
adaptations, no form of conscious awareness 
was required as an early adaptation, suggesting 
that the overlap between consciousness and 
attention—conscious attention—is an equally 
recent phenomenon and must be the exception, 
rather than the rule, with respect to how 
consciousness interacts with attention.2 
 
 
2. Attention, functionalism, and evolution 
 
The voluminous experimental research on 
different forms of visual attention demonstrates 
that attention needs to be defined functionally. 
In fact, definitions of the forms of attention aim 
at capturing different functions (Rensink, 2014). 
For example, the most basic form of selective 
attention has the broad function of filtering 
information and optimally distributing cognitive 
resources to modulate information processing. 
The idea that attention performs a kind of 
filtering function is central, and early theories of 
attention defined it in terms of monitoring and 
filtering.  
There are different types of information, 
however, that can be selected by attentional 
mechanisms. (We will limit our discussion to 
the visual domain, though it is relevant to the 
other sense modalities.) For example, feature-
based attention selects various types of 
perceptual features in a visual scene, such as 
color, line segment orientation, and motion 
signals. Spatial attention has the function of 
quickly parsing the surrounding environment 
into regions for information registration. Object-
based attention is a mid-level form of attention 
that specifically targets units of discrete objects, 
and the mechanisms for detecting, tracking, and 
                                                
2 The various levels of the consciousness and attention 
dissociation (CAD) are examined in detail in Montemayor 
& Haladjian (in press). 
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counting objects have been found in many 
species. Using Spelke’s (1994) terminology, 
these forms of attention are constitutive of an 
ancient and fundamental core knowledge that 
structures many types of cognition and 
information processing. While all forms of 
attention are defined in terms of functions 
related to information processing, some forms 
of attention are more basic than others. Based 
on the current theoretical and empirical 
understanding of attention, it is plausible to 
hypothesize that different forms of attention 
evolved at different times. This thesis has 
critical consequences for the evolution of 
conscious attention and for understanding the 
relationship between consciousness and 
attention. 
2.1. Selective attention as the earliest form of 
attention 
Once one identifies the functions of attention, 
the neural correlates of these functions can be 
studied across species. For example, selective 
attention and object-based attention, which 
include basic discrimination functions, involve 
substantial portions of the cortex in humans. 
Even simple shifts of attention between objects 
activates “a large network of cortical areas” 
(Ward, 2013, p. 54). Shifting focus from one 
object to another is a fundamental function of 
attention, indispensible for selectively 
interpreting spatial information and without 
which basic navigational or visual search tasks 
would be impossible. Brain imaging studies on 
humans and non-human primates also identify a 
hierarchical organization of visual areas that 
increase in processing complexity (for a review, 
see Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). This 
hierarchical organization mirrors the 
increasingly complex functions of vision that 
correspond to the different forms of visual 
attention required to select and integrate 
information within this organization.  
From an evolutionary perspective, the ability 
to attend to multiple aspects of the environment 
is so ubiquitous that it must be physically 
instantiated by different neural structures across 
species. Forms of selective attention to 
environmental features have been found in 
many species, including those with minuscule 
brains, such as fruit flies and dragonflies 
(Wiederman & O'Carroll, 2013). While it is 
clear that insects do not enjoy the attention 
capacities of humans and animals with larger 
brains, this is an extremely relevant fact because 
fruit flies diverged 500 million years ago from 
the human branch in the evolution of different 
types of nervous systems (Ward, 2013). This 
form of selective attention must be causally-
driven in the sense that it depends on automatic 
processes that detect features according to 
principles of salience, and is selective in the 
sense that such features trigger a relevant goal-
related behavior (resulting from adaptive 
influences) or become available for selection by 
the filtering mechanisms of attention.  
The multiple correlates of the functions of 
basic selective and object-based attention 
presents intriguing possibilities. For example, 
the cortex is a large area of the brain and costly 
in terms of energy expenditure. Therefore, basic 
forms of selective attention must be physically 
instantiated in much smaller and less costly 
brain areas (as Ward suggests). This indicates 
that forms of selective attention have evolved at 
different times in different species with very 
diverse neural anatomies. In fact, the presence 
of such a variety of neural systems that support 
attention suggests that selective attention has 
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evolved repeatedly and independently in 
different species, as is generally believed to be 
the case in the evolution of various brain 
systems (Striedter, 2006). 
We must emphasize that we are not claiming 
that these forms of cross-species attention are 
identical in all respects. It seems obvious that 
one reason why attention activates vast areas of 
the human cortex is because of the rich and 
highly integrated contents that human attention 
is capable of encoding. We do not argue, for 
example, that any form of signal detection 
counts as selective attention. Rather, we are 
simply pointing to the empirically-confirmed 
fact that many species with small nervous 
systems are capable of shifting attention from 
one object to another, as insect navigational 
capabilities demonstrate (see Gallistel, 1990a, 
for discussions about navigational functions that 
depend on such capabilities, like the solar 
ephemeris function). These cognitive functions 
are verifiable empirically and are only possible 
because of the integration of information that is 
being represented and attended to, rather than 
the mere causal interaction between internal 
biology and external factors. This kind of 
attention, manifested in simple shifts, must be 
among the earliest cognitive functions (but we 
shall remain neutral with respect to the 
demarcating question of which species have 
attention capacities similar to human attention). 
The likelihood that selective attention 
evolved repeatedly and independently across 
many species suggests that it is a crucial and 
very basic adaptation (Ward, 2013). Following 
Smith and Szathmáry’s (1995) proposal 
concerning the evolutionary importance of 
transitions in how information is stored and 
used, the appearance of cognitive systems 
capable of discriminating and selectively 
attending to different features certainly must 
have marked a new transition into more 
integrated and complex behaviors. At a 
minimum, selective attention reveals purposeful 
behavior and a minimal form of directed 
intentionality. As more complex forms of object 
recognition became available, for example by 
basing attention on conceptual content retrieved 
from long-term memory, better planning 
became available. Yet, the resources of selective 
attention still would be based on the same early 
adaptations that animals needed for performing 
basic survival activities, such as navigating 
through their environment. 
Parenthetically, it is productive to contrast 
the predominance of attention as an early 
adaptation with the rarity of what some have 
suggested to be the basic functions that underlie 
conscious awareness: the capacities for 
language and mindreading (see Carruthers, 
2000; Dennett, 1969, 2005). Language, 
according to some theorists (e.g., Fitch, Hauser, 
& Chomsky, 2005), may itself be a spandrel and 
a uniquely human capacity. Mindreading (or 
having a theory of mind) seems to be more 
widespread, but robust forms of mindreading 
also seem to be uniquely human, such as those 
required to pass the false-belief task or having 
socially specified forms of attention to detect 
the intentions of others (Tomasello, 1999). 
Notice that these are the views that do not 
consider consciousness to be an illusion, a 
mystery, or a primitive feature of the universe.  
Even if one thinks that cognitive function 
could explain the emergence of consciousness, 
attention and consciousness would still be 
dissociated since the lower-level forms of 
attention have evolved in organisms that do not 
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seem to have conscious awareness (see Griffin 
& Speck, 2004). This is not to deny that there 
may be phenomenal consciousness in animals—
some animals with central nervous systems may 
experience pain or color in ways that resemble 
human experiences. Yet, the functions of 
attention would precede or at least be 
evolutionarily independent from these neural 
processes (see Tallon-Baudry, 2012, for a 
discussion on the possible evolutionary 
differences between consciousness and attention 
based on their underlying neural structures). 
Before examining the possibility of an 
evolutionarily advanced conscious attention, we 
should describe the empirically-accepted forms 
of attention and how they relate to mechanisms 
for cross-modal integration.  
2.1.1. Forms of selective attention: feature-
based attention 
Feature-based attention is a more primitive 
information selection mechanism that interacts 
with low-level perceptual processes. These 
information processing systems are organized 
according to specialized brain regions 
responsible for registering specific types of 
visual information, such as color, motion, or 
segment orientation (for a review, see Maunsell 
& Treue, 2006). This organization is related to 
the modularity of mind hypothesis (Fodor, 
1983), such that different perceptual modules 
developed for processing different features—
although they are not clearly independent 
regions in the brain and may be better described 
as organized into distributed networks (see 
Finlay & Brodsky, 2006). Feature-based 
attention interacts with these low-level systems 
to select information in a typically automatic 
manner, but this selection process can be biased 
by higher-level signals based on task demands.  
In support of a functionally modular 
organization of feature-based attention, neural 
studies have identified a hierarchically 
organized visual cortex, with basic feature 
processing occurring in lower areas of the brain 
(see Hubel, 1995, pp. 93-125; Koch, 2004, pp. 
49-86). Visual information from the retina flows 
through the optic nerve into the lateral 
geniculate nucleus (LGN) of the thalamus 
before reaching the primary visual cortex (V1). 
From there, information flows via two major 
pathways, the dorsal and the ventral, also 
referred to as the “where” and the “what” 
pathways respectively (Kastner & Ungerleider, 
2000; Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994). The dorsal 
“where” pathway tends to process information 
about motion and location of objects, with the 
middle temporal (MT) area being especially 
sensitive to motion and higher contrast stimuli 
(Tootell et al., 1995). The ventral “what” 
pathway processes featural information about 
objects including color, shape, or orientation. 
For example, color information, which is 
initially detected by retinal cones, is processed 
in the LGN and areas V1 and V2 (for a review, 
see Gegenfurtner, 2003). Orientation-specific 
cells in V1 detect orientation, contour, and 
curvature, which are important for determining 
shapes and object-hood (Hubel & Wiesel, 
1962).  
Another characterization of these two 
processing streams proposes that the dorsal 
stream supports “vision for action” while the 
ventral stream supports “vision for perception” 
(Milner & Goodale, 1995, 2008). On this 
account, the dorsal pathway provides visual 
information for action-planning and the 
execution of motor commands and is processed 
separately from the ventral pathway, which 
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provides the contents of visual experience. 
Often, the visual information for successful 
actions only travels in the dorsal pathway and 
serves its purpose without reaching awareness. 
The importance of noting these separate 
processing streams is that some observed 
dissociations between attentional processes and 
consciousness depend on this anatomical 
organization, where information from the dorsal 
processing stream does not need to reach 
conscious awareness in order to affect behavior.  
Further up in the visual cortex, area V4 
processes orientation information as object 
shapes. The global grouping of contour 
information (i.e., the Gestalt notion of “good 
continuation”) is crucial for the formulation of 
shapes and objects (Geisler, Perry, Super, & 
Gallogly, 2001; Kovács, 1996) and relies on 
cortical processes that are responsible for global 
contour integration processes (Tanskanen, 
Saarinen, Parkkonen, & Hari, 2008). This 
integration process also explains how the visual 
system can extract shape information from 
images based on low-level processing 
mechanisms (Marr, 1980). 
Feature-based attention, therefore, can be 
considered a fundamental and basic form of 
attention from which richer representations are 
built. Evidence among both invertebrates and 
vertebrates exists for this type of basic-level 
attention, from insects to primates (Ward, 
2013). Generally, this is a “bottom-up” attention 
that operates within feature-rich environments 
based on its role in the evolutionary 
development of these systems (Rensink, 2014). 
It is also hierarchically organized, such that 
different levels in the visual cortex are 
responsible for certain features, and a biasing of 
the competition for feature selection can occur 
on several of these levels through feedback 
loops that integrate the influence of higher-level 
attentional processes. The results of these 
independent feature-specific selection 
mechanisms, which then may be organized into 
feature maps, can be linked together based on 
spatiotemporal information to form more 
detailed representations (see Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Zhang, 2006). 
2.1.2. Forms of selective attention: spatial 
attention 
Spatial attention filters information based on 
spatial coordinates and is another important 
mechanism that evolved early in order to aid 
navigation and other goal-directed motor 
behaviors. An influential model for this form of 
attention is the “spotlight model” (Posner, 
Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), where attention can 
be focused on a specific region and shifted 
around as needed. Spatial attention can be 
diffuse and spread over the entire visual field 
but without much fidelity in regards to the 
information that is processed, or it can be 
focused on a particular area with higher 
resolution. This range of attentional resolution 
has been described as a “zoom lens” that 
distributes resources in a top-down manner as 
needed (Eriksen & Yeh, 1985). Therefore, 
spatial attention is thought to be able to operate 
on discrete objects, empty space, or spread 
globally to quickly determine the gist of the 
information present across the visual field. 
Indeed, recent studies show that a distributed 
attention can capture quickly a statistical 
summary representation of the information 
outside of the focus of attention (e.g., Alvarez & 
Oliva, 2008). Such studies support the idea that 
visual information can be pooled into an 
ensemble summary representation to help 
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overcome the visual processing limits imposed 
by attention-demanding tasks, indicating a more 
basic and independent form of spatial attention. 
The neural systems that support spatial 
attention are thought to be located in the pre-
central sulcus, intraparietal sulcus, and lateral 
occipital sulcus, areas related to motor activity 
(Beauchamp, Petit, Ellmore, Ingeholm, & 
Haxby, 2001). Although some studies have 
identified activations as early as V1, spatial 
attention tends to be modulated in higher 
cortical stages, such as the ventral 
occipitotemporal cortex (Brefczynski & DeYoe, 
1999), and the act of shifting attention from one 
spatial location to another is induced by signals 
from the posterior parietal cortex (Yantis et al., 
2002). Attentional capture (typically considered 
to be a more automatic deployment of attention) 
occurs in the superior parietal cortex, which also 
is related to spatial shifts of attention (de 
Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2004). The 
significance of such findings is that they 
differentiate the systems that shift spatial 
attention from those that maintain sustained 
attention. Although classifications of neural 
systems supporting different aspects of spatial 
attention are still under scrutiny, there is a sense 
of how different processes are localized in 
different brain regions, which differentiates 
these forms of attention based on their 
functions. More complex spatial abilities are 
present in vertebrates and seem concentrated in 
the right brain hemisphere, with the frontal and 
parietal structures being particularly active 
during spatial attention tasks and have some 
overlap with working memory networks (Awh 
& Jonides, 2001). More specialized shifts of 
attention, such as covert attention, appear to 
require neurons that are involved in executive 
control and only found in higher primates such 
as apes and humans (Wright & Ward, 2008, p. 
240). 
Covert attention is a particularly insightful 
form of spatial attention, which refers to the 
willful shift of attention outside the center of 
one’s gaze without changing the direction of 
gaze (Carrasco, 2011; Posner, 1980; Posner, 
Cohen, & Rafal, 1982; Wright & Ward, 2008). 
That is, the focus of attention can be oriented 
independently of the physical manipulation of 
gaze—in contrast to overt attention, which 
refers to what is at the center of attention and on 
the fovea (center) of the eye. Covert attention 
has been shown through various tasks where 
observers view a center of a stimulus display but 
shift their focus of attention to a target in the 
periphery without moving their eyes or making 
other physical movements (e.g., Peterson, 
Kramer, & Irwin, 2004). This form of attention 
is particularly important for the planning of 
saccadic eye movements, for example, by 
covertly detecting where the eye needs to shift 
its gaze in order to obtain more detailed 
information from that region (Yeshurun & 
Carrasco, 1998). This attentional shift is faster 
than making eye movements and tends to favor 
shifting toward objects (Horowitz, Holcombe, 
Wolfe, Arsenio, & DiMase, 2004). The shifting 
of covert attention occurs higher in the brain 
hierarchy, in the frontal eye field of the frontal 
cortex (Thompson, Biscoe, & Sato, 2005). This 
type of attention may also correspond to the 
ability to attend to certain thoughts from 
memory or other mental states that are not 
immediately linked to sensory information, 
indicating a more “advanced” use of attention. 
2.1.3. Forms of selective attention: object-based 
attention 
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Attention can also be drawn to things in the 
world that display object-like properties, such as 
cohesion, symmetry, and common fate (for 
reviews, see Chen, 2012; Scholl, 2001). Object-
based attention requires a two-stage process that 
begins with the individuation of objects (a 
bottom-up process) upon which a selective 
attention operates such that object features are 
bound and maintained into a persistent 
representation, which then can lead to the 
identification of the object. Together, 
individuation and identification contribute to the 
experience of attending to specific items in the 
world and supports abilities like enumerating 
sets of items, tracking multiple objects, or 
attending to a single item in detail.  
The first stage of object-based attention, 
individuation, is a basic data-driven process that 
selects object-like structures for further 
processing and is thought to occur in parallel 
within a cognitively impenetrable module 
referred to as “early vision”. Pylyshyn (1989, 
1999, 2001) describes a possible mechanism 
responsible for individuating visual objects via 
Visual Indexing Theory. On this view, visual 
indexes are references or “pointers” to objects in 
a visual scene that can be maintained over 
temporal and spatial changes. These primitive 
data-driven pointers are triggered by object-
defining properties, such as cohesion or rigidity, 
that parse a discrete object from a visual scene 
(but without necessarily encoding any of these 
properties into memory). Once a pointer is 
assigned, it can attach to and follow a moving 
object over time. Visual indexes also serve 
localization and enumeration abilities (Chesney 
& Haladjian, 2011; Haladjian & Pylyshyn, 
2011; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994), facilitate visual 
search (Burkell & Pylyshyn, 1997), and are 
considered the first step in solving the binding 
problem (Treisman, 1996; Wolfe, 2012; Wolfe 
& Cave, 1999) by providing the core structure 
for building object-based representations. 3 
The second stage in object-based attention is 
identification. This stage requires the binding of 
object features from feature maps, as described 
in Feature Integration Theory (Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980), into sustained mental 
representations that enables object identification 
and recognition. Selective attention plays a 
crucial role in forming persisting object 
representations by allowing features from a 
visual scene to build a coherent representation 
incrementally in visual memory (Treisman, 
1998, 2006). In this regard, Object File Theory 
describes how object-based attention can 
operate via mid-level “object file” 
representations (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 
1992). Here, a spatiotemporal correspondence is 
established (to distinguish which object went 
where) and requires reviewing operations to 
construct cohesive representations of features 
and detect changes. Although the binding of 
features can happen as quickly as 200-ms 
(Feldman, 2007), the efficiency of this process 
is sensitive to cognitive load and becomes more 
difficult when attention or working memory 
resources are preoccupied with other tasks or 
multiple object representations (Johnson, 
Hollingworth, & Luck, 2008; Wheeler & 
                                                
3 The individuation of visual objects is related to 
demonstrative thoughts and provides a solution to the 
“reference problem”, which is concerned with how an 
object can be tracked through space and time and be 
linked to a mental representation (Perry, 1997; Pylyshyn, 
2001, 2003, 2007; Siegel, 2002). In this way, attention 
helps anchor mental representations in the world by 
providing links to higher-level representations (e.g., 
object representations in working memory). 
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Treisman, 2002). Given that these are capacities 
for basic object perception, similar forms of 
early visual mechanisms for individuation and 
identification must be present across species. 
The object-based attention model argues that 
the visual system favors the selection of whole 
objects in a visual scene as opposed to 
properties such as location or individual 
features, and many studies provide substantial 
support for this object-based attention (e.g., 
Baylis & Driver, 1993; Chen, 2012; Kahneman, 
et al., 1992; O'Craven, Downing, & Kanwisher, 
1999; Scholl, 2001; Scholl, Pylyshyn, & 
Feldman, 2001; Yantis, 1992). Object-based 
representations are formed in visual short-term 
memory, which is limited in the number of 
objects and the amount of featural information 
that can be represented (e.g., Alvarez & 
Cavanagh, 2004; Cowan, 2001). Such studies 
suggest that a more complex form of attention is 
related to voluntary endogenous attention and 
requires selectively focused attention to bind 
and maintain the features of object files. This 
exemplifies the interaction between low-level 
and high-level forms of attention that makes the 
study of attention so complex. Given the more 
centralized voluntary aspects of this form of 
attention, its evolution may not necessarily 
correspond with the evolution of the most basic 
and adaptive forms of attention (i.e., feature or 
spatial attention). 
In addition to the selection of relevant 
objects, the inhibition of irrelevant items in the 
visual scene has been shown to be object-based 
(Theeuwes, Van der Stigchel, & Olivers, 2006). 
In fact, such inhibition is specific to the 
irrelevant objects marked for inhibition and does 
not occur in the empty space near those objects 
(Pylyshyn, 2006; Pylyshyn, Haladjian, King, & 
Reilly, 2008), nor on objects clearly segregated 
within three-dimensional space (Haladjian, 
Montemayor, & Pylyshyn, 2008). Attentional 
capture is more likely to occur in the empty 
space between moving objects than on the 
irrelevant objects that are being inhibited (even 
when controlling for object-related masking 
effects). This evidence supports the notion that 
low-level object individuation has the tendency 
to operate on both task-relevant and task-
irrelevant objects automatically, and that object-
based attention operates in crucial ways that do 
not always involve the processing of 
information into conscious awareness (Chou & 
Yeh, 2012; Melcher & Vidnyanszky, 2006; 
Mitroff, Scholl, & Wynn, 2005; Norman, 
Heywood, & Kentridge, 2013).  
Object-based theories provide an account of 
how detailed representations are formed through 
the spatiotemporal binding of featural 
information. In other words, they describe the 
integration of independently-processed visual 
features that produce representations that refer 
to external objects. It is these object 
representations that are most likely the contents 
of conscious experience, even though not all 
object files reach conscious awareness (Mitroff, 
et al., 2005). Note, however, that this is a claim 
about content, rather than the basic functions of 
early visual attention. A major problem with the 
characterization of the function of 
consciousness is that these contents may be 
processed without any associated experience of 
these contents (i.e., there may be no associated 
feeling, phenomenal property, or what it is like 
to be in a representational state with those 
contents). 
Supporting object-based attention are brain 
areas that are generally considered to be more 
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recently evolved. In addition to the inputs from 
and feedback signals to the visual cortex (Cohen 
& Tong, 2013), the superior parietal lobe (above 
the visual cortex) and right lateral fusiform 
cortex are involved in object-based attention, 
including when shifting attention between 
objects (Yantis & Serences, 2003). Area MT 
detects motion and assists in tracking movement 
(Newsome & Paré, 1988), and related actions 
engage inhibitory processes from the extrastriate 
areas V2 and V4 (Bundesen, Habekost, & 
Kyllingsbaek, 2005; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 
1997; Mangun, 1995; Posner, 1992). These 
structures have been identified in other higher 
species, such as pigeons and monkeys, though 
little research has investigated object-based 
attention in animals (see Roelfsema, Lamme, & 
Spekreijse, 1998; Ushitani, Imura, & 
Tomonaga, 2010).  
To reiterate, our focus here is on attention as 
a primitive cognitive function and on why this 
function is one of the earliest adaptations of the 
nervous system. We are not, therefore, claiming 
that the contents to which humans can attend are 
also part of the early adaptations that constitute 
the functions of attention in early vision. 
Contents (presumably conceptual ones) are 
likely to be related to conscious attention and 
may not be necessary for basic discrimination 
tasks, such as feature-based attention. Those 
who defend the view that attention is identical 
with consciousness (e.g., Prinz, 2012) must say 
either that any animal capable of navigating and 
selecting features from the environment is 
conscious or that these basic forms of attention 
do not deserve the name “attention”. Because of 
the evolutionary considerations that serve as 
theoretical background, as well as the broad 
consensus that these are empirically confirmed 
forms of attention, we find both options highly 
problematic. The early forms of attention are 
fundamental and adaptive, from which cross-
modal attention evolved. 
2.2. Cross-modal attention 
As has been emphasized in the vast literature on 
visual attention (of which we only presented a 
small fraction), the recognition of object 
features within the visual modality requires 
mappings based on spatiotemporal coordinates. 
The Feature Integration Theory for visual object 
recognition is based on this idea (Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980). Although there is controversy 
concerning this proposal (Pylyshyn, 2007), it is 
uncontroversial that human visual attention is 
capable of integrating many features that are 
spatiotemporally organized into a coherent and 
useful representation. Cross-modal attention in 
non-human cognition need not be as rich in 
feature integration as in humans, but it certainly 
requires mappings between different geometric 
structures (e.g., sound and vision). 
Proprioception and cross-modal attention, 
therefore, seem to require a centralized nervous 
system and a centralized way of integrating and 
interpreting different types of information, 
which may be the basis of voluntary attention. 
Related to this idea, Hommel’s Event File 
Theory proposes an enhanced version of object 
files that incorporates both features and motor 
commands (Hommel, 2004, 2005, 2007; 
Zmigrod, et al., 2009). This theory provides a 
richer notion of object representations in the 
sense that these cross-modal sensory 
representations also integrate action-planning 
information. In terms of sensory integration, 
auditory and visual information presented 
together are often taken to be part of the same 
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event (e.g., when you hear and see a motorcycle 
approaching, and plan to move out of its way). 
Even with asynchronous presentations of 
multimodal information (e.g., 350-ms gap 
between tone and visual stimulus onset), 
associations can be formed that allow 
asynchronous features from separate modalities 
to be considered as part of the same event; this 
sort of feature binding does not necessarily 
require an awareness that it is happening, nor 
does it affect behavior when the temporal 
asynchrony is consciously perceived (Zmigrod 
& Hommel, 2011). The importance of this 
theory is that it addresses the ultimate purpose 
of the ability to attend to things in the world and 
represent them—in order to act on them. This 
describes a source of agency for the system 
representing information and is related to 
complex behaviors such as tool usage. 
There is also support for early interactions 
across modalities in task-irrelevant perceptual 
learning of cross-modal cueing effects (Batson, 
Beer, Seitz, & Watanabe, 2011). That is, when 
an irrelevant sound is paired with a specific 
stimulus in a manner that is not obvious to the 
test subject, subsequent performance can 
nevertheless be affected after training in a way 
that indicates a cross-modal association was 
implicitly learned. In order for these 
associations to occur, information from different 
modalities must be integrated in some way, and 
thus necessitate a mechanism to enable this 
integration. To this end, cross-modal attention 
integrates a variety of features, which requires 
mappings between the different modalities. In 
addition to object-based or event-based 
mappings, another mapping concerns egocentric 
and allocentric frames of reference (Gallistel, 
1990a, 1990b) that enable an organism to 
navigate successfully within an environment. In 
the case of time, these mappings require a cross-
modal window of simultaneity, because each 
modality has been found to have different 
simultaneity windows.4 The basic idea is that 
cross-modal information integration and robust 
integration of memories (episodic and semantic) 
create a platform for the egocentric perspective 
that seems to characterize phenomenal 
consciousness.  
Like the previous cases of attention within a 
single modality, cross-modal attention for 
features, objects, and regions of space is likely 
to have been adaptive, as species with brain 
mechanisms capable of mapping information 
from one region to another created more robust, 
complex, and stable representations of their 
environments. Cross-modal integration is the 
basis of many processes that increase the 
probability of succeeding at vital tasks, such as 
foraging and hunting (Gallistel, 1990a, 1990b). 
While this seems obvious, it is significant that 
these mappings require sophisticated 
representations of the environment, or at least 
robust forms of memory for space and feature 
binding not required by more basic forms of 
attention. This, however, need not entail that 
these representations or cognitive capacities 
involve conceptual content. 
2.3. Conceptual content and attention 
The emergence of semantics and conceptual 
content is a notoriously controversial issue in 
philosophy and cognitive science. Some 
philosophers think that only humans have the 
capacity for conceptualizing and forming beliefs 
based on concepts (see McDowell, 1994; for 
                                                
4 See Pöppel (1988) on these findings, and Montemayor 
(2013) for discussions on the representational 
characteristics of the cross-modal simultaneity window. 
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dissent concerning the need for concepts, see 
Stalnaker, 1984). Conceptual content seems to 
be deeply associated with the language capacity 
because of its compositional and generative 
characteristics (Fodor, 1998). It is also 
associated with the more complex activities of 
imagination and metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). All theories of conceptual content relate 
it to the language capacity or the ability to form 
beliefs that support inferential reasoning and, 
therefore, conceptual attention seems to be a 
recent phenomenon (given the assumption that 
language and inferential reasoning emerged 
recently with the evolution of our species). 
Without endorsing any specific view on the 
scope of the conceptual contents of attention 
(e.g., are they uniquely human or do other 
species have them?), we would like to illustrate 
the type of cognitive enrichment that highly-
integrated conceptual contents allow and 
emphasize their relatively recent evolution. For 
example, contents are conceptualized in Gestalt 
phenomena and ambiguous images. In cases like 
the Necker cube, the image conceptualized as a 
three-dimensional cube flips back and forth, 
from appearing to have an upward orientation to 
a downward one, generating an attention pattern 
with a specific temporal rate. In other cases, 
however, the attention pattern is between two 
very different conceptual contents, as in the 
duck-rabbit drawing, which can appear to be a 
rabbit or a duck, depending on how the image is 
interpreted. This kind of conceptual attention 
shifting must have appeared at later stages in the 
evolution of attentional mechanisms. Although 
they depend on automatic processes (e.g., the 
back-and-forth switching process characteristic 
of ambiguous images), these contents of 
attention are clearly much more conceptualized 
than the basic forms of selective attention, 
which constitute more basic features of the 
visual scene. 
Based on similar considerations, 
enrichments of skill that build on reflex-like 
capacities must also be based on attention for 
conceptual contents. Object-based attention 
provides a possible feature integration 
mechanism that enables the recognition of 
external objects, people, and places by 
comparing these contents to concepts stored in 
long-term memory. In a very simplistic account, 
being able to recognize things in the world relies 
on the binding of features, both basic (such as 
shape and color) and conceptual (such as seeing 
a duck or a rabbit). More realistically, however, 
these basic processes are supplemented by the 
rich information stored in memory. For 
example, the detection of only a few features is 
often sufficient for the brain to predict an 
object’s identity based upon the stored content 
in long-term memory (see Clark, 2013, for a 
discussion of related predictive brain processes). 
Therefore, conceptual cognition relies on basic 
perceptual processes and has evolved to enable 
the interaction between these basic processes 
and stored content in long-term memory in 
order to increase the efficiency of perception 
and cognition. This advancement necessitates a 
complex integration of not only perceptual but 
also conceptual information (i.e., a process that 
integrates not only currently attended features 
but potentially relevant ones in memory).  
2.4. Voluntary attention 
Sustained attention is deeply associated with the 
passage of time and the sense of self. For this 
reason, it seems that voluntary (or willfully 
sustained endogenous attention) must be at the 
basis of self-awareness. Here an interesting 
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issue emerges. There must be two kinds of 
voluntary attention: with and without self-
awareness. Many forms of sustained attention 
(e.g., keeping track of moving objects, searching 
for a feature among distractors) can be 
performed without high forms of self-
awareness. But clearly, self-awareness is 
associated with sustained attention, as when one 
meditates or recites a phrase to oneself to 
consolidate memories. A form of sustained 
attention must have emerged early and is closely 
related to the described attentional processes 
(e.g., sustained attention for tracking or focusing 
on details). The type of voluntary attention that 
involves a sense of self, however, must be more 
recent due to the complexity of neural 
connections required for self-reflection and 
meta-cognition.  
Voluntary attention is contrasted to the more 
automatic (and primitive) involuntary forms of 
attentional control. The distinction between 
involuntary and voluntary attention is often 
studied as the difference between bottom-up and 
top-down attention (see Theeuwes, 2010). That 
is, attention can be stimulus-driven and 
automatically guided toward external events that 
involuntarily catch the focus of attention, or it 
can be voluntarily guided through willful 
selection. Bottom-up attention includes 
attentional capture by abrupt onsets of stimuli or 
sudden changes in motion or luminance 
(Burnham, 2007; Theeuwes, 1992; Yantis, 
1993; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994), and can be 
described by “winner-takes-all” models of 
attention (e.g., Koch & Ullman, 1985) that 
characterize the early processes in feature-based 
attention. Such forms of involuntary attention 
can bias the neural activity for selection into 
higher processes and can affect behavior 
without reaching conscious awareness.  
From an evolutionary perspective, bottom-
up involuntary attentional processes can be seen 
as more primitive, earlier adaptations that assist 
basic evolutionarily-relevant survival abilities, 
such as procuring food, avoiding prey, or 
finding mates. These early selection processes 
are tied to feature and spatial attention, and 
process information according to the specialized 
(functional) modules in the brain (Rensink, 
2014). As described above, there are forms of 
attention that are related to more primitive brain 
regions that operate in a bottom-up and 
automatic manner. These brain regions emerged 
early in evolution and include invertebrates, 
which are animals that usually would not be 
considered to have consciousness (Griffin & 
Speck, 2004). 
On the other hand, voluntary and top-down 
attention can be described as being endogenous 
and more deliberate, which can bias the 
competing neural activity in lower-level 
cognition based on the goals of the current task. 
Voluntary attention is likely to have evolved 
later as organisms were required to adapt and 
respond to more complex representations related 
to forms of learning, tool usage, and social 
interactions such as communicating and 
maintaining social order within groups. These 
higher-level cognitive processes require a 
voluntary, sustained form of attention, as well as 
interactions with other cognitive processes, such 
as working memory and long-term memory. 
Animals exhibiting such higher-level behaviors 
include blue jays, crows, parrots, macaque 
monkeys, and chimpanzees, as they show signs 
of tool manipulation or rudimentary language 
abilities (Griffin & Speck, 2004). Having a self-
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awareness, however, seems to be a more 
complex attribute of voluntary attention than 
mere sustained attention. Self-awareness 
involves reflecting on the contents of what is 
being attended and, fundamentally, on one’s 
own conscious perspective because one is not 
only aware of these contents, but also aware that 
one is thinking about them.  
Whether or not animals possess self-
awareness remains debatable, but some have 
proposed ways in which basic consciousness 
might be identified in animals (see Edelman, et 
al., 2005; Griffin & Speck, 2004; Seth, Baars, & 
Edelman, 2005; Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, 
Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). For example, 
Bayne’s (2007) theory of “creature 
consciousness”, which specifies whether or not 
an organism can be said to be phenomenally 
conscious, requires mechanisms that generate 
the “phenomenal field” (related to activity in the 
thalamus), and neural inputs from the different 
cortical areas responsible for processing sensory 
and memory-related information. Only after 
integrative processes occur can consciousness 
be considered present in animals, but such 
claims require empirical support. Currently, 
problem-solving behaviors (e.g., tool usage) in 
animals provide the best examples of the 
possible presence of conscious attention in 
animals (for a review on animal consciousness, 
see Griffin & Speck, 2004). 
Various brain regions, considered to be 
more evolutionarily advanced, have been 
identified to support voluntary top-down 
attention. These areas include the prefrontal 
cortex, which is also associated with executive 
function (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996; 
Petersen & Posner, 2012). Parietal and frontal 
regions in the cortex seem to be involved in 
attentional control by initiating and maintaining 
attentive states (Yantis & Serences, 2003). This 
goal-directed attention, however, remains 
constrained by low-level computations in the 
visual system (Yantis, 2000), further showing 
how top-down and bottom-up processes interact. 
Similarly, recent studies suggest that feedback 
and recurrent processes are especially important 
for explaining how top-down modulation occurs 
and how conscious attention may arise (Lamme, 
2006; Pollen, 2003; Theeuwes, 2010). The 
anatomy of the brain and its evolution, 
therefore, strongly suggest that different forms 
of attention became interfaced and interlocked 
at different stages in the development of our 
species, with more advanced forms related to 
the growing complexity in the cortex and 
recurrent pathways to the more primitive brain 
regions. The voluntary/involuntary dichotomy 
has been challenged recently, however, since 
there are other forms of attention that do not fall 
into these categories, such as when learned 
rewards or habits influence attention (e.g., Awh, 
Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). Nevertheless, 
most attentional processes tend to fall under one 
of these two descriptions. 
2.5. Effortless attention 
Effortless attention (like bottom-up attentional 
processes) is typically considered an 
involuntary, sensory form of attention that does 
not always reach conscious awareness. These 
effortless processes serve to obtain information 
from the environment for higher-level 
representations, which often require more effort 
to maintain. On the other end of this spectrum is 
effortful attention, which, like top-down 
attention, is described as focused, deliberate, 
voluntary, or goal-driven, and produces the 
subjective feeling of expending effort.  
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Some complex attentional processes, 
however, can be so engrossing that they produce 
the subjective feeling of being involved in a task 
effortlessly such that one loses a sense of time 
(Bruya, 2010). It is this latter version of 
effortless attention that is particularly insightful, 
because it may be related to expertise and is 
suggestive of how memory systems can interact 
with attention to influence the perception of 
effort and time. Effortless attention in this sense 
is a more controversial form of attention 
(compared to other forms of higher-level 
attentional processes) and has only recently 
been discussed in the literature. Similarly, the 
feeling of “flow” is related to effortless 
attention, where one’s focus is on the mechanics 
of a physical activity with very little effort or 
attention to other forms of stimulation (see 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Flow is typically 
considered as being closer to a more primary 
conscious experience, often described as an 
experience that is “in the moment”, which does 
not include a reflective self-awareness that is 
more typical of deliberate thoughts. 
Assuming that effortless attention is a 
legitimate form of attention, it seems to have 
evolved recently and may be associated with the 
most experientially rich forms of conscious 
awareness. Necessarily, it would be a form of 
conscious attention. Moreover, it would also be 
one of the richest and most information-
demanding forms of attention, suggesting a deep 
association with complex representation and 
more sophisticated cognitive tasks, even though 
these complex representations may not reach 
conscious awareness themselves. This type of 
effortless attention involves a level of expertise 
that requires a willful, effortful attention to be 
executed many times prior to this experience of 
effortless attention (e.g., as in procedural 
learning). This would be related to learning 
capabilities of the most reflective, deliberate, 
and advanced type. Effortless attention also 
presupposes that the agent has self-awareness in 
order to experience this sense of effortlessness. 
Because of all these characteristics, it seems that 
effortless attention, including the experience of 
flow, must have evolved after many of the brain 
areas related to more basic kinds of attention 
developed into their current forms found in 
humans today. More importantly, effortless 
attention seems to demand the interrelation 
between conscious phenomenal awareness 
(what it is like to experience oneself 




3. The evolution of conscious attention 
 
A brief chronological sketch of the evolution of 
conscious attention may start with: 1) selective 
attention for grounding features of the geometry 
of sensory space, such as spatial and feature-
based attention; 2) cross-modal detection of 
these features that require mappings across 
different feature maps and interfaces between 
different geometries; 3) conceptual content; 4) 
voluntary attention; and 5) forms of effortless 
attention with very high cognitive demands but 
little experienced effort. Functional definitions 
of consciousness, which include integrative 
mechanisms or global workspace theories, are 
only associated with 3–5, and most of these 
accounts locate such capacities only in the very 
recent evolution of humans. Thus, the 
dissociation between consciousness and 
attention follows from strictly evolutionary 
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considerations, even if one can define 
consciousness functionally (e.g., as the function 
that integrates information for global broadcast 
in a linguistic-like format). 
The dissociation between consciousness and 
attention is even more severe if one considers 
conscious awareness to be a form of illusion 
(e.g., Humphrey, 2011). Clearly, considering 
consciousness to be an unsolvable mystery or a 
primitive feature of the universe that cannot be 
defined functionally will entail full dissociation 
from attention. That is, these views preclude any 
possible overlap between attention (which is 
defined functionally) and consciousness (which 
cannot be defined functionally). Therefore, to 
provide an account of how conscious attention 
might have evolved, we shall focus on some 
illusory and spandrel views, rather than on 
views that entail full dissociation and no 
possible overlap between consciousness and 
attention.  
If one subscribes to the view that 
consciousness transcends any functional 
explanation, then considerations about evolution 
become irrelevant for the scientific study of 
consciousness. This conclusion derives from the 
fact that evolutionary developments are 
explained traditionally in terms of functions. 
Some empirically-based views on 
consciousness, however, also agree that 
evolutionary explanations are inadequate to 
account for the nature of consciousness because 
it cannot be reduced to functions concerning 
selective or adaptive processes (e.g., Block, 
1995). Furthermore, even some who adopt an 
evolutionary perspective in their explanation of 
consciousness reject the view that it is an 
adaptation (e.g., Carruthers, 2000; Dennett, 
2005). Those who claim that consciousness has 
the purpose of providing an illusory basis for 
social and empathic development (Humphrey, 
2011) also fall into this category. Illusion 
accounts of consciousness, however, could be 
understood skeptically, as suggesting that 
consciousness is not the product of evolution 
because the illusion of a unique subjective 
perspective may be considered pernicious rather 
than advantageous.  
Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue, 
however, that the anatomical complexity of 
systems associated with phenomenal 
consciousness provides enough evidence that 
consciousness is in fact an evolutionary 
adaptation. Their primary claim is that 
phenomenally conscious experience involves 
inputs from different modalities as well as 
different channels within a modality (e.g., 
different forms of visual features that comprise 
feature-based attention). These different inputs 
must be integrated in some manner to produce a 
unified conscious experience. The integration of 
these different channels, then, is an indication of 
a rather complex process and involves many 
neural structures. Therefore, the structural 
complexity that engenders phenomenal 
consciousness should support the idea that 
consciousness is an adaptation that is present in 
at least many vertebrates (as some philosophers 
assume, following Nagel, 1974). Also, 
dissociations between consciousness and 
perceptual inputs, such as in blindsight5, further 
                                                
5 Blindsight is a condition where damage to the visual 
cortex prevents the individual from being able to 
consciously perceive a visual stimulus, yet they are still 
able to act upon it (e.g., pick up an object) since the 
relevant information for the motor system can by-pass the 
visual cortex (Brogaard, 2012; Kentridge, 2012; 
Kentridge, Nijboer, & Heywood, 2008; Weiskrantz, 
1996). 
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support the idea that multiple channels provide 
input to consciousness, since sometimes these 
channels can fail to deliver information into 
conscious awareness even when this input can 
influence behavior. Various forms of inputs can 
suffer from such dissociations between the 
attentional systems for action and those for 
perception (see Brogaard, 2011; Kentridge, 
2012).  
The idea that consciousness serves the 
function of cross-modal and within-modal 
integration has support from various researchers 
(for a review, see Baars, 2002). Based on our 
previous arguments, however, even this view 
that characterizes consciousness as adaptive 
would entail dissociation, since a highly 
integrative, cross-modal conscious attention 
must have evolved much later than the basic 
forms of modality-specific selective attention. 
Consciousness—even as an integrative 
mechanism—cannot be identical to attention 
because of these early adaptations of low-level 
attentional systems and the more recent 
development of the integrative forms of object-
based and cross-modal attention.  
Therefore, most extant accounts of the 
evolution of consciousness may be reduced to 
three options: 1) dualist accounts that reject any 
physical explanations of consciousness; 2) 
physicalist accounts that reject any evolutionary 
explanations of the nature of consciousness; and 
3) physicalist accounts that propose 
evolutionary explanations of consciousness, but 
reject that it is an adaptation (e.g., it is a 
spandrel).6 Consequently, these three options 
                                                
6 Dualist accounts tend to assume a metaphysical 
explanation of consciousness, which requires an account 
outside the physical world; even some interpretations of 
quantum mechanics seem to suggest some form of 
entail that conscious attention is not an 
adaptation because consciousness is not 
adaptive. In other words, the evidence of 
integration within and across attention systems 
that occurs without requiring conscious 
awareness (e.g., Mudrik, et al., in press) reduces 
the likelihood that conscious attention is an 
evolutionary-motivated adaptation. This faces 
us with the question: what is the purpose of 
conscious awareness if such integration occurs 
without it? Furthermore, even views that 
consider consciousness as adaptive, which are 
certainly the exception in the contemporary 
literature (e.g., Nichols & Grantham, 2000), 
require a dissociation between basic forms of 
attention and cross-modal integrative conscious 
attention.  
Since the first two options consider 
evolution to be theoretically irrelevant in 
describing consciousness or conscious attention, 
we shall focus on the third option. There are at 
least two theories that fall within this third 
option. The first is that consciousness plays an 
important cognitive function and can thereby be 
defined in functionalist computational terms. 
According to this view, however, consciousness 
is not an adaptation but rather a spandrel—the 
result of an accidental combination among 
adaptive functions, such as language and 
mindreading. The main role of conscious 
awareness, then, is to broadcast contents that are 
computed in a uniform format (presumably 
conceptual), which plays an essentially 
epistemic role since it provides access to 
contents across different modalities for the 
purpose of providing information to support 
                                                                            
dualism (e.g., the von Neumann interpretation). 
Physicalist accounts require a physical (e.g., neural) basis 
to phenomenal conscious experience. 
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beliefs or goal-driven actions. Dennett (1969, 
1991, 2005) and Carruthers (2000) defend this 
view, as well as most theorists who favor 
“global broadcast” or “global workspace” views 
of consciousness (e.g., Baars, 1988; Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001). 
The second possibility is that consciousness 
is a spandrel, but that its function is not 
epistemically driven—unlike attention, which is 
epistemically driven because it provides access 
to contents that justify goal-related beliefs. 
Thus, according to this view, consciousness is 
largely integrative but serves an illusory 
function that creates the appearance of a 
coherent and unified unique self that enjoys 
private access to a world inaccessible to anyone 
else, with important ethical and spiritual 
consequences—a view defended by Humphrey 
(2011). Thus the main point of contention 
between these two spandrel views is whether the 
main purpose of consciousness is to broadcast 
information or to produce a useful (though 
admittedly strange, functionally-speaking) 
illusion associated with phenomenal content. 
Nevertheless, both illusion views entail severe 
forms of dissociation between consciousness 
and attention. 
An important source of confusion regarding 
the broadcast view is that it seems to suggest 
that consciousness must be identical to 
attention, because the purpose of attention—at 
least cross-modal attention—seems to be to 
broadcast and give “access” to information (see 
Prinz, 2012). This claim, however, requires 
disambiguation because of the different 
functions and evolutionary development of 
distinct types of attention. The less dissociative 
interpretation of this “access” view is that 
selective attention is an early adaptation while 
cross-modal attention to conscious contents is a 
later adaptation. Cross-modal attention, 
however, may not be sufficient to have global 
access to uniformly formatted contents, 
although attention seems to be necessary for this 
global access.  
Even if cross-modal attention guaranteed 
access to uniformly formatted contents, it would 
still be a later evolutionary achievement. This 
would require the development of a global 
format, the broadcast of information from 
different specialized areas of the brain, and the 
presence of all the basic forms of attention. 
These requirements strongly suggest a 
dissociation between basic forms of attention 
and conscious cross-modal attention. Related to 
this theoretical account of consciousness is the 
possibility that the presence of reentrant neural 
processing (i.e., feedback processing, in 
addition to feedforward, that appears important 
for complex attentional processes) among brain 
structures may be an indication of mechanisms 
that support consciousness (Di Lollo, Enns, & 
Rensink, 2000; Hamker, 2005; Lamme, 2003; 
Seth & Baars, 2005; Tononi & Koch, 2008). 
Complex reentrant networks, especially with the 
frontal cortex, are also considered later 
adaptations. 
All other interpretations of spandrel views 
entail a stronger dissociation between 
consciousness and attention. In particular, 
illusion views characterize consciousness in 
terms of the unique and inaccessible perspective 
of a cohesive self, which demands forms of 
introspection that are unlikely to be found 
across species and are certainly beyond the 
functional aspects of cross-modal attention. In 
other words, any view on consciousness that 
requires a subjective or phenomenal story limits 
  23 
Note: This is a near final draft; the final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-014-0718-y 
Please cite: Haladjian, H. H., & Montemayor, C. (in press). On the evolution of conscious attention. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.  
how much of a relationship it could have with 
the various forms of attention found in humans 
and animals. Therefore, all the possible views 
on the evolution of consciousness and attention 
show that they must be dissociated to some 
degree. 
Framing the relationship between 
consciousness and attention in adaptive terms 
helps solve a problem that exacerbates the 
difficulties concerning the study of conscious 
attention: many researchers mean different 
things when they use the terms “consciousness” 
and “attention”. For example, when researchers 
use these terms, are they referring to what Block 
(1995) calls “access” consciousness (the 
availability of representational content for use 
by various cognitive systems), or is it 
experience and the associated idea of 
“phenomenality” and subjectivity? In other 
words, is it just attention or attention plus 
subjective experience (conscious attention)? 
One crucial advantage of an evolutionary 
perspective on the relation between 
consciousness and attention is that it 
demonstrates that they must be dissociated 
regardless of how one defines them among the 
viable options currently available within the 
debate. To the best of our knowledge, no other 
extant view on the relationship between 
consciousness and attention has this advantage. 
Additionally, it becomes clear that conscious 
attention cannot be either simple selection or 
pure phenomenality. According to the functional 
views of consciousness, voluntary and 
involuntary conscious attention play the role of 
broadcasting information that can be used for 
many cognitive purposes—information which is 
formatted in a common cognitive code. The 
formatting of conscious contents presents the 
following problem: whatever conscious 
attention is, it cannot be simple selection, or 
even cross-modal attention without quality 
access to highly integrated contents—a point 
that is uncontroversial. But then, conscious 
attention is a lot more than simply phenomenal 
consciousness because just experiencing 
contents (e.g., feeling pain or anxiety) need not 
have the selective and knowledge-seeking 
(epistemic) functions of attention. One can 
experience pain and pleasure without having 
any attention-driven process of selecting 
information and accessing contents. One also 
could have reflex reactions to stimuli and 
produce selective behavior that requires 
attention, but not experience things such as pain 
or pleasure. Furthermore, as has been confirmed 
empirically, many attention processes can 
happen unconsciously. This indicates that 
conscious attention is more than phenomenality 
and requires many sub-processes related to 
attention.  
To summarize our arguments thus far, the 
earliest forms of attention, including those 
considered automatic (e.g., feature-based, 
spatial), act as selection mechanisms to filter 
relevant information for higher-level processing. 
These basic forms of attention have been 
identified across species and appeared very 
early in the evolution of nervous systems. 
Through mechanisms such as feature maps and 
spatial indexing processes, a mid-level object-
based attention developed to facilitate the 
representation of complex multi-feature objects, 
allowing for the sustained maintenance of these 
representations in working memory structures, 
and for relating them to contents stored in long-
term memory. This development may be the 
crucial step in the production of conscious 
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attention, since these systems can perform more 
complicated tasks beyond simple feature 
detection, including object tracking, complex 
visual search tasks, and object recognition. 
Object-based attention then provides the 
scaffolding for more complex cognitive 
processes, including cross-modal integration, 
maintained activation of representations and 
attention networks, and various social 
interactions that include communications and 
developing a theory of mind. These higher-level 
processes rely heavily on working memory 
systems for maintaining and manipulating this 
information. If a global workspace does indeed 
occur, it would be somewhere within the 
interaction between attention and memory, and 
here is where conscious attention would lie. 
Clearly, many basic forms of attention must 
happen before conscious attention occurs. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: conscious attention—more 
than a feeling 
 
Regardless of what consciousness is, it is certain 
that conscious attention cannot be a mere 
feeling or pure “what it is like” (see Nagel, 
1974). Attention requires selection, short-term 
memory, contents, and the kind of cognitive 
processing that can be defined functionally. 
Therefore, conscious attention also should have 
a functional purpose. If conscious attention is 
indeed an integrative mechanism that combines 
inputs from different perceptual channels and 
information stored in long-term memory, then 
we need to develop a better understanding of 
how the functions of integration are associated 
with subjective phenomenal experiences. For 
example, what it is like to experience pain, and 
not simply respond to signals from pain 
receptors without the subjective experience, 
needs to be associated with the functional 
aspects of selective and cross-modal attention 
that are necessary to produce pain experiences 
(an arguably difficult and controversial issue). 
The challenge of why conscious attention is not 
merely phenomenal experience highlights the 
difficulties ahead in providing a theory of 
conscious attention. A final theory of conscious 
attention must incorporate the fact that 
evolutionary arguments indicate a dissociation 
between the basic forms of attention and 
consciousness. 
In addition to the studies on blindsight, 
further support for the dissociation between 
attentional processes and consciousness comes 
from studies on motor actions and conscious 
experience (e.g., Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun, & 
Nakayama, 2012; Desmurget et al., 2009; Kühn 
& Brass, 2009; Wegner, 2003). Such studies 
indicate that perceptual decisions and motor 
commands are executed before one becomes 
conscious of that decision or intention to make 
the action, with different neural correlates 
relating to the subject feeling of action (Filevich 
et al., 2013). These findings are often used to 
argue that consciousness is unnecessary for 
actions, since there are background processes 
that execute these actions and we just “feel” like 
we are consciously doing things. Similarly, the 
separate ventral and dorsal pathways for 
information processing in the visual cortex 
indicate that there are independent sources of 
information for determining what is seen 
(“vision for perception”) and executing motor 
commands (“vision for action”), and this often 
results in a dissociation between the information 
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awareness. That is, visual information can be 
processed for the execution of motor commands 
outside of conscious experience, which argues 
against the idea that consciousness evolved in 
order to serve an integrative function to support 
action. This conclusion suggests, in the very 
least, that some forms of conscious attention 
may not be as globally available as some 
theories assume. 
Most of the extant views on consciousness 
and attention entail a severe dissociation, and 
even the few views that consider consciousness 
as adaptive also entail dissociation. This 
dissociation holds regardless of how “attention” 
and “consciousness” are defined. Since the 
current views reject full dissociation, they allow 
for some form of overlap between the 
evolutionary distinct processes of consciousness 
and attention—this conscious attention, 
however, must outline a strictly functional 
description of phenomenality. Ultimately, 
conscious attention must be a spectrum of 
different processes rather than a single type of 
process.  
One source of data confirming a spectrum of 
conscious attention concerns learning. Some 
researchers argue that the case of learning 
presents a dissociation between consciousness 
and attention. In particular, some claim that 
conscious awareness—and not attention—is 
necessary for learning (e.g., see Lovibond, Liu, 
Weidemann, & Mitchell, 2011; Meuwese, et al., 
2013). Of course the problem is that reporting 
mental content requires consciousness and the 
experiments typically implemented require 
reportability, either through verbal language or 
through gestures. Additionally, even when 
implicit perceptual learning is found under 
conditions where attention is supposedly not 
engaged (e.g., the inattentional condition in 
Meuwese, et al., 2013), whether or not all forms 
of attention are truly absent in these cases 
remains debatable, since we would argue that 
higher-level focused attention may be absent 
under inattentional conditions, but low-level 
visual processing, such has feature-based 
attention, must still be operating. Furthermore, 
there certainly must be unconscious forms of 
learning, like procedural or associative learning 
in humans and animals (Griffin & Speck, 2004). 
This suggests that there may be a spectrum of 
conscious attention processes in learning, some 
relying more heavily on phenomenal 
consciousness, while others relying almost 
exclusively on low-level attention. This 
relatively new research focus in relation to 
consciousness may be especially promising in 
revealing whether or not conscious attention 
does indeed serve a functional purpose.  
As for another promising area of research, 
recent theories have begun to explore the 
interaction between working memory and 
attentional processes in relation to conscious 
experience. For example, there is evidence for 
interactions between selective attention and 
working memory in the presence of top-down 
modulation, with some shared neural systems 
(Awh & Jonides, 2001; Gazzaley & Nobre, 
2011). Another proposed mechanism related to 
working memory is the “central executive” 
system (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996; Baddeley 
& Weiskrantz, 1993), which is thought to help 
maintain object representations in visual 
working memory via various attention and 
working memory processes, such as the visuo-
spatial sketchpad, episodic buffer, and 
phonological loop (Baddeley, 2000). These 
memory structures may also support self-
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reflection and help distinguish the source of 
phenomenal experience, be it from sensory 
inputs or from long-term memory (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2009). Together, these components 
describe ways in which perceptual information 
is maintained for cognition, which may be 
necessary for conscious awareness. Indeed, the 
relationship between working memory and 
attention is a crucial one that has been recently 
receiving more attention (for overviews, see 
Gazzaley & Nobre, 2011; Hollingworth & 
Maxcey-Richard, 2013; Oberauer & Hein, 2012; 
Olivers, 2008). 
Regardless of whether conscious attention is 
a single process or a spectrum of processes (as 
we believe), our main conclusions are the 
following. First, evolutionary considerations 
show that attention and consciousness must be 
dissociated in some form, ranging from 
functional dissociations (e.g., global versus 
more localized or within-modality attention) to 
severe dissociation (as most theories on the 
evolution of consciousness necessarily assume). 
Moreover, this conclusion entails that 
consciousness cannot be identical with attention. 
That is, although many attentional processes are 
necessary to provide the contents for conscious 
experience, attention and consciousness are not 
identical processes and cannot be reduced to one 
another given the range of dissociations. Unlike 
any other extant view, these conclusions hold 
regardless of how one defines the terms 
“consciousness” and “attention”. It remains 
possible that the overlap between consciousness 
and attention, or conscious attention, serves a 
functional purpose, but this has yet to be clearly 
defined or adequately supported by empirical 
evidence. The task now is to examine this 
relationship given the fact that the most 
common forms of attention evolved 
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